Initially, industrial control systems (ICS) had very little similarity with information technology (IT) systems. ICS was an isolated system, running a proprietary control protocol, and using dedicated hardware and software. Now, widely used, low-cost Internet Protocol (IP) devices have replaced proprietary solutions in ICS, but this has also increased the possibility of network security breaches and incidents. As ICS adopts IT solutions to improve enterprise connectivity and remote access capabilities, many factories are using standard computers, operating systems (OS), and network protocols to design and implement projects, so ICS has become more like an IT system. This integration supports new IT functions. Compared with the past ICS, it significantly reduces the isolation from the outside world. Therefore, more security guarantees are needed to ensure that these ICS can work reliably. Typical IT systems have been designed with security solutions to deal with these security risks, but when the same solutions are introduced into the ICS environment, special precautions must be taken. In some cases, new security solutions are needed for the ICS environment.
Compared with traditional IT systems, ICS has many different characteristics, including different risks and priorities. This includes the health and safety of employees' lives, the protection of the ecological environment, the operation of production equipment, and the impact on the national economy. ICS has different performance and reliability requirements, and the operating systems and applications used are different from typical IT systems. In addition, the design and operation of the control system sometimes create conflicts between security and efficiency (for example, the need for password authentication and authorization should not hinder or interfere with ICS emergency operations. The following lists some special considerations when considering ICS security. factor:
1 Performance requirements. ICS are generally time-critical systems. Various devices must meet acceptable delay and jitter standards. Some systems require deterministic response. High throughput is usually not necessary for ICS. In contrast, IT systems usually require high throughput and can withstand a certain degree of delay and jitter.
2 Availability requirements. Many ICS processes are continuous in nature. Industrial process control systems cannot accept unexpected interruptions. If human interruption is required, it must be planned and arranged several days or weeks in advance. Pre-implementation testing is necessary to ensure the high availability of ICS. Except for unexpected interruptions, many control systems do not allow random stop and start in order to ensure continuous production. In some cases, the products produced or the equipment used are more important than the interruption of information. Therefore, the use of typical IT strategies, such as restarting a component, is usually unacceptable in ICS, and will adversely affect the availability, reliability, and maintainability requirements of the system. Some ICS use redundant components and run in parallel, and can switch to backup components to provide continuity when the main component fails.
3 Risk management requirements. In a typical IT system, the confidentiality and integrity of data are usually the main issues. For ICS, personnel safety, equipment fault tolerance, prevention of environmental damage, endangering public health or confidence, compliance, equipment loss, intellectual property loss, product loss or damage are the main issues. Those responsible for operations, security, and maintenance of ICS must understand the important link between safety and security.
4 The focus of the security architecture. In a typical IT system, the primary focus of security is to protect the operation of IT assets, whether these assets are centralized or distributed, and information is stored or transmitted. In some architectures, the centralized storage and processing of information is critical and can be given more protection. For ICS, edge clients (such as PLC, DCS, operator station, etc.) need to be carefully protected because they are directly responsible for the control of the terminal process. The protection of the ICS central server is also very important, because problems with the central server may adversely affect each edge device.
5 Physical interaction. In a typical IT system, there is no physical interaction with the environment. In the field of ICS, ICS has a very complex interaction with physical processes and consequences, which can be reflected through physical events??. All security functions integrated into the ICS must be tested (for example, offline on a comparable ICS) to prove that the ICS is fully functional.
6 Time critical response. In a typical IT system, the implementation of access control does not consider the size of the data stream. For some ICS, automated response time or human-computer interaction system response is very critical. For example, the password authentication and authorization required on the human machine interface (HMI) shall not hinder or interfere with the emergency actions of ICS. The flow of information cannot be interrupted or damaged. Access to these systems should be subject to strict physical security controls.
7 The system is running. The ICS operating system (OS) and applications may not tolerate typical IT security practices. Old systems are particularly vulnerable due to lack of resources and frequent interruptions. Control networks are usually more complex and require different levels of expertise (for example, control networks are usually managed by control engineers rather than IT personnel). In a running control system network, software and hardware upgrades are very difficult. Many systems may not have the required features, including information encryption, error logging, and password protection.
8 Resource constraints. ICS and real-time operating systems are often resource-constrained systems and usually do not include typical IT security capabilities. ICS components may not be able to provide computing resources to increase security functions. In addition, in some cases, due to the license and service agreement of the ICS manufacturer, third-party security solutions are not allowed. If the installed third-party application is not confirmed or approved by the supplier, the service support may be lost.
9 Communications. The communication protocols and media for field device control and internal processor communication used in the ICS environment are usually different from those in the general IT environment and may be proprietary.
10 Change management. Change management is critical to maintaining the integrity of IT and control systems. Unpatched software is one of the biggest vulnerabilities for the system. Software updates of IT systems, including security patches, are usually updated in a timely manner in accordance with corresponding security policies and procedures. In addition, these procedures are often executed automatically using server-based tools. ICS software updates are not always implemented in a timely manner, because these updates require thorough testing by the industrial control application supplier before the end user of the application can implement it. It is also necessary to plan and schedule ICS downtime in days or weeks in advance. As part of the update process, ICS may also need to be reconfirmed. Another problem is that many ICS use older versions of the operating system, which vendors no longer support. Therefore, the available fixes may not apply. Change management also applies to hardware and firmware. In the process of change management, the ICS part requires ICS experts (for example, control engineers) to work with security and IT personnel to carefully evaluate.
11 Management support. A typical IT system allows diversified support methods. Due to the interconnected technical architecture, the supported content may be completely different. For ICS, service support is usually through a single supplier, and other suppliers may not be able to provide diversified and interoperable solutions.
12 Component life. Typical IT components have a life span of about 3 to 5 years. Due to the rapid evolution of technology, the problem is relatively simple. For ICS, many technologies are aimed at specific applications, and the life cycle of deployed technologies is usually 15 to 20 years, and sometimes even longer.
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